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BY MAJORS ERIC HOVEY AND 
JASON HOTALEN, U.S. MARINE CORPS 
The drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan has not engen-dered a more peaceful or stable 
world order. Rather, the United States' 
post-Cold War dominance in the mari-
time domain is increasingly beset by chal-
lenges. In the Middle East, the U.S.-sup-
ported 33-nation maritime coalition has 
been stymied in developing a coherent 
response to Iranian aggression. In the Pa-
cific, the United States' longstanding re-
lationsnip witti the Philippines has grown 
increasingly strained, a fact demon-
strated by President Rodrigo Duterte's 
threat to nullify a 21-year-old bilateral 
military cooperation agreement.' In Af-
rica, South Africa hosted a trilateral na-
val exercise with Russia and China for the 
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· Partnerships based on cultural understanding and 
shared interests can bolster U.S. national security. 
Two case studies provide insights. 
first time in 2019, burnishing China's credentials as an in-
ternational naval power.2 In each case, strategic setbacks 
were not the result of a shortfall of military power or lack 
of modem equipment; rather, they represent an inability 
to outpace competitors in partnership building, otherwise 
known as security cooperation. 
Maritime security cooperation builds and maintains 
alliances that facilitate the access, intelligence, and bur-
den-sharing U.S. naval forces require to support timely 
and sustained forward operations. While modernizing for 
direct conflict with Russia and China may be the most ur-
gent requirement for the Navy and Marine Corps, conflict 
between great powers often unfolds in the peripheries. 
Because the U.S. military cannot patrol every potential 
flashpoint, a more structured approach to maritime se-
curity cooperation is essential for the Navy and Marine 
Corps to have the partnerships and access necessary to 
maintain peace through strength or to prevail in combat 
when deterrence fails. 
INSIGHTS FROM TWO AFRICAN CASE STUDIES 
The continent of Africa has strategic significance in the 
maritime domain: The Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, 
the Bab el-Mandeb strait, and the Mozambique Chan-
nel are all critical junctures through which much of the 
world's energy resources and commerce flows. Because 
U.S. adversaries recognize the importance of controlling 
or projecting influence over these vital waterways, ana-
lyzing U.S. influence and partnerships within Africa is 
relevant to the larger question of how the U.S. Navy and 
Marine Corps can counter Russia and China.3 
Existing maritime security cooperation operations 
with two key African partner nations illustrate both the 
successes and challenges of the current U.S. approach. 
Senegal. Senegal is actively involved in land-based U.S. 
security cooperation activities, but U.S. efforts aimed at 
increasing Senegalese capability in the maritime domain 
have been less fruitful.4 The Senegalese discomfort with 
"maritime security" is based on a fraught history of mari-
time security cooperation with the European Union (EU) 
and-importantly-on a fundamental conflict of interest 
between Senegal and the EU with regard to migration. 
Morocco. The United States' close ties with the King-
dom of Morocco extend back to the founding of the re-
public, with Morocco being the first country to recog-
nize the United States. U.S.- Moroccan cooperation in 
the maritime domain is strong and predicated largely on 
shared interests in promoting regional stability.5 
These two countries demonstrate that a one-siz.e-fits-
all approach to security cooperation is not feasible, be-
cause every nation's unique historical and cultural cir-
cumstances shape its security cooperation relationship 
with the United States. But their case studies suggest two 
takeaways with overarching application: 
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• The Navy and Marine Corps must build their cadres 
of military personnel with regional security and language 
training and use them to evaluate, prioritize, and maintain 
maritime security partnerships. 
• Continued U.S. naval dominance is predicated on fo-
cusing maritime security cooperation programs on ac-
tors/institutions with whom the United States has over-
lapping interests. 
SENEGAL: OBSTACLES TO SUCCESS 
Dating back to 2005, maritime security discussions in 
Senegal have been inextricably linked with migration. 
An exponential increase in the number of Senegalese mi-
grants transiting to Europe by way of the Canary Islands 
led EU leaders to declare a state of emergency, and the 
EU quickly moved to interdict migration routes. This in-
cluded heavy patrolling of West African waters by Eu-
ropean navies, as well as the provision of modern patrol 
craft and training for Senegalese forces.6 
In addition, the EU began explicitly linking the provi-
sion of development aid to countries' cooperation in ac-
cepting the return of unwanted migrants.7These activities 
all shared the goal of preventing unwanted migration of 
West Africans to Europe; however, they were couched in 
the tenninology of combating the human trafficking and 
victimization of migrants. 
Algeria 
; _ _ _____ Gulf of Guinea 
J 
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Understanding the cultural and economic significance 
of migration in Senegalese society is critical. Fully 4 per-
cent of Senegal's population lives and works abroad, and 
the money sent home by them accounts for between l 0 
percent and 14 percent of Senegal's gross domestic prod-
uct.8 For many Senegalese families, economic migration 
is a matter of survival, and young men who migrate and 
support their families are respected and admired.9 All of 
this has created a strong cultural nonn whereby the high-
est ambition of many young men is to migrate. 
Ultimately, migration (and the income it generates) is 
a fundamental and existential interest for Senegal. Be-
cause U.S. efforts to expand maritime security cooper-
ation closely resembled EU countennigration efforts in 
substance (donation of vessels and provision of training) 
and language (combating illicit "trafficking"), they could 
be interpreted as targeting Senegalese migration to Eu-
rope. Such an interpretation creates a fundamental con-
flict between U.S. objectives and Senegalese interests. 
This interplay of migration with maritime security is-
sues demonstrates how cultural memory and values can 
create obstacles to U.S. efforts. Without an understand-
ing of the cultural and economic significance attributed to 
migration by Senegalese society and of the history ofEU 
maritime security cooperation activities in West Africa, 
one would not know that "maritime security" and "coun-
tertrafficking" carry a weight of meaning that could be re-
ceived with antipathy by would-be Senegalese partners. 
MOROCCO: AN ENDURING PARTNER 
The Kingdom of Morocco provides a benchmark for suc-
cessful maritime security cooperation, beginning in 1777, 
when Sultan ben Abdullah encouraged U.S. vessels to 
visit Moroccan ports, and continuing to this day with nu-
merous military and economic exchanges. Morocco has 
executed bilateral live-fire exercises with the U.S. Navy 
and also hosted the opening ceremony of Phoenix Ex-
press 2019, a multilateral U.S. Navy-led exercise. These 
exercises, along with Morocco's designation as a Major 
Non-NATO U.S. Ally and the 2004 U.S.-Morocco Free 
Trade Agreement, benefit both countries. The United 
States gains access and influence with a capable partner 
that straddles the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, while 
Morocco's regional influence is bolstered by U.S. mili-
tary equipment and economic agreements.10 
The U.S.-Morocco relationship reflects the evolving 
security and economic needs of both countries. U.S. poli-
cymakers partnered with King Hassan II during the Cold 
War, despite his brutal internal crackdowns, because sup-
porting his reliably pro-U.S. regime served larger U.S. 
aims for countering Soviet influence.11 The close ties per-
sisted after the Cold War, although U.S. interests shifted 
toward counterterrorism while the Moroccan government 
remained focused on regime stability. U.S. policy empha-
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Understanding a partner nation's cultural and economic values 
rs crftlcal to the success of maritime security efforts. In Senegal, 
for example, economic migration Is an existential Interest, and 
the negative association of maritime security operations with 
European countermlgratlon efforts may have undercut U.S.-led 
efforts. A program designed around Issues of common concern 
(such as Illegal fishing) could be more successful. 
sis has again shifted, to great power competition, but the 
consistent overlap with Morocco for regional stability 
has facilitated a strong relationship.12 
The U.S.-Morocco case study underscores two points: 
First. strong security relationships depend on perceived 
mutual interests, and second, maintaining the relation-
ship with a key U.S. Africa Command partner serves U.S. 
interests vis-a-vis great power competition.13 
The first point highlights the need for military regional 
experts to analyze and make sense of each nation's in-
terests, avoiding conflicts and seeking alignment to the 
maximum extent possible. For example, the United 
States recognizes neither Morocco's claim to Western Sa-
hara nor the Algerian-backed secessionist claims of the 
self-declared Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic-an 
imperfect compromise that nonetheless allows the United 
States to pursue engagement with both Morocco and Al-
geria.14 Any actual or perceived recognition of an inde-
pendent Western Sahara is a red line for the Moroccan 
government, as demonstrated by its cancellation of Af-
rican Lion 2013 after the U.S. State Department ques-
tioned human rights monitoring in Western Sahara.15 The 
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Morocco has executed multiple bilateral exercises with the U.S. 
Navy, Increasing the ability of U.S. and Moroccan maritime forces 
to work together to address security concerns and Increase sta• 
blllty In the region. The Royal Moroccan Navy frigate Mohammed 
VI sails here with the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) during exer-
cise lightning Handshake. 
cancellation signaled that recognition of Western Sahara 
is an existential security issue for the Moroccan govern-
ment that trumps the security cooperation relationship 
with the United States. 
Because even the strongest security cooperation rela-
tionships can be undennined if there is a mismatch of in-
terests, it is critical that the Navy and Marine Corps have 
the appropriate expertise to navigate the red lines. 
The second point is that maintaining a strong U.S.-Mo-
rocco relationship is relevant to the United States' larger 
competition with Russia and China. Morocco's continued 
partnership with the U.S. Navy, as well as its support to 
large-scale exercises such as African Lion, means greater 
access and interoperability with the U.S. Navy and Ma-
rine Corps. In addition, the Moroccan military budget is 
one of the largest in Africa, and much of it goes toward 
U.S. weapon programs (as opposed to Russian/Chinese 
competitors), including an upgrade of their fleet ofM I A I 
Abrams tanks valued at roughly $1.26 billion.16 In short, 
the relationship gives the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps 
increased influence with a reliable security partner and 
comes at the expense of Russia and China. 
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AWAY AHEAD 
These case studies speak to the relevance of maritime se-
curity cooperation to counter China and Russia and of-
fer insights into how the United States can dominate in 
this arena. The Navy and Marine Corps first must deepen 
their bench of sailors and Marines with regional educa-
tion and language skills and then use them to focus mari-
time security programs and activities on those actors and 
institutions whose goals and interests most closely align 
with those of the United States and who stand to benefit 
from U.S. programs. 
Senegal and Morocco underscore the first point. In Sen-
egal, the negative historical association of maritime secu-
rity operations with countennigration may have undercut 
U.S.-led efforts, which suggests that a security cooperation 
program designed around issues of common concern (such 
as illegal fishing or drug interdiction) could be more suc-
cessful. No such negative associations exist in Morocco, 
but this historically strong relationship could be quickly 
derailed by mention of Western Sahara. Unfortunately, ed-
ucational and career opportunities for sailors and Marines 
with regional and language expertise are limited, which 
stymies the services' ability to assess, prioritize, and sus-
tain maritime security cooperation operations. 
There are several steps the Navy and Marine Corps can 
take to optimize their cadres of sailors and Marines to sup-
port maritime security cooperation. Many officers and 
staff noncommissioned officers already attend the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) for various masters' programs, 
so opportunities exist to partner with the newly created 
Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU) in com-
mon subject areas, akin to the existing relationship between 
NPS and the Defense Acquisition University (DAU).17 Just 
as a student in the NPS program management program 
can receive DAU accreditation, an NPS student in the re-
gional security studies program should be able to apply ac-
ademic credits toward DSCU accreditation. Foreign stu-
dents, such as those in the International Military Education 
and Training Program, could be paired with NPS students 
for research projects that reflect bilateral interests and re-
al-world combatant command challenges. 
Another step the Navy and Marine Corps can take is 
to adopt each other's best practices for their respective 
security cooperation workforces. The Navy lacks a ded-
icated security cooperation course-the five-day Mar-
itime Engagement and Crisis Response course covers 
security cooperation among multiple topics-but could 
create one, or perhaps establish a command modeled on 
the existing Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group 
(MCSCG), to formally coordinate its security coopera-
tion activities. The missions managed by the MCSCG 
and its Navy counterpart would both improve U.S. in-
teroperability with allied navies and facilitate bilateral 
sea denial and sea control operations. 18 
Similarly, the Marine Corps should follow the Navy's 
lead and create a primary military occupational spe-
cialty to support career management of foreign area offi-
cers (FAQs), its regional and language subject matter ex-
perts. A small, board-selected FAQ community, akin to 
the 8059/8061 air/ground acquisitions field, would pro-
vide a dedicated cadre of expertise to prioritize and sup-
port global maritime security cooperation efforts. 
A more structured maritime security cooperation work-
force would support a critical best practice: focusing se-
curity cooperation programs and activities on actors and 
institutions that share U.S. interests. The Navy and Ma-
rine Corps must judiciously allocate limited maritime se-
curity cooperation resources, which takes time and re-
gional expertise. They must not only identify key partner 
nations across each combatant command, but also en-
sure these relationships are sustained against rising influ-
ence from Russia and China. A dedicated maritime secu-
rity workforce with regional and language training would 
prioritize and maintain these partnerships. 
There is no better time to implement these policy 
changes: The Navy and Marine Corps already are ad-
justing the organization, equipping, and training of their 
forces to meet the demands of the National Defense Strat-
egy, and a stronger, more structured maritime security 
workforce would complement this effort. The ability of 
allies to help or hinder military operations is clear: from 
France's support to the U.S. Continental Navy during the 
Revolutionary War, to the disruption of U.S. war plans 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom caused by Turkey's re-
fusal of access for U.S. forces. Enhancing the maritime 
security cooperation workforce and formalizing opera-
tions in this domain are the best ways for the Navy and 
Marine Corps to develop the partnerships they need to 
deter and defeat great power adversaries. 
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